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L DEFENSE

PEECH

BY

JOR-GENERAL LEONARD WOOD, U. S. A.

EIGHTH EDITION

JUN 18 1936

THE SWISS SYSTEM

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GENERAL WOOD'S SPEECH

AT ST. PAUL'S SCHOOL

CONCORD, NEW HAMPSHIRE

General Wood said: I thank you, young gentlemen, for the very kind reception which you have given me. It is always an inspiration to meet a body of enthusiastic youngsters who have the world ahead of them, and if one can do anything to make more clear the responsibilities and obligations which confront them and suggest a way to meet and overcome them, it is a duty which should be performed. What I wish to say to you tonight may sound a bit harsh and inject an element of seriousness into this occasion which will tend a little to take from it the spirit of joyousness which marks the end of a year's school work well done. I am going to say something to you about your obligations to the country as soldiers, for you come of the stock and represent a class whose responsibility to the country in time of war has always been generous. I noticed today your fine soldiers' monument, erected in honor of the graduates of the school who gave their lives in the nation's service in the Spanish War. Among them are the names of men of my regiment. The responses of

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these men is indicative of the response which is going to be made by men of their kind in the future. You are going to respond whether you are trained or not. What I want to bring home to you is that to be a really good citizen of a republic which is dependent upon its citizen army you must be not only willing but prepared, and I want to say to the parents and friends assembled here tonight that they must remember that these youngsters are going to respond to the call of the country whether they wish it or not; that it is a duty which the great majority of right-minded boys will not attempt to shirk, and the question I want to ask them is—Are they going to send these boys to us prepared to be efficient soldiers or are they going to send them to us untrained and unprepared to make such sacrifice as they may have to make effective? This subject was brought home to me very forcibly the other day by a letter received from a friend in the West, who had just lost his boy in the battle at Ypres. He said:

You remember the last time we met that I told you of my 17-year-old boy at school in England. Well, he left school and went into the Home Defence force, but this was not enough, and he transferred and joined a regiment at the front—one of the new regiments—and was killed at Ypres. It was sad enough and hard enough to lose the boy, but I shall never be able to get rid of the feeling that neither he nor his mates had a sporting chance; they were unprepared and untrained.

Before going into the details of this subject, I want to impress one fact upon you, and that is that our country has never yet in its entire history met single-handed a first-class country prepared for war. The shrinkage in enlistments and steady diminution in the strength of our military establishment during our struggle for independence points out clearly and conclusively to any fair-minded person the invaluable assistance of France in the Revolution. In the War of 1812–1814 we were, from a military standpoint, a minor issue, for Great Britain was engaged in that tremendous struggle with Napoleon—a struggle which required the great bulk of her forces on sea and land and prohibited her from concentrating her efforts upon the war in America.

The question is—Shall we drift on, regardless of the teachings of history, making no adequate preparation for the possibilities of the hour, or shall we take heed from the experiences of the past not only of our own country, but of all lands since history was written, which is, that preparedness is the best insurance against war, or shall we accept as our guide for the future the theory of those deluded people who tell us that wars are over and that this is the last great war, forgetful of the fact that these same people, or people of the same type of intelligence, announced that the Russo-Japanese War was the last war, then that the Balkan War was the last war? The answer is no. We must judge the future by the past and make wise preparation to protect and safe-

guard those rights which our forefathers handed down to us. It seems to me that no right-minded person can hesitate in deciding which is the path of wisdom and which is the path of folly. We do not want war, but we must not forget that there is many a peace which is infinitely worse than war, such as a peace which results from failure to do our clear duty, to fight for what we believe is right, or to support our honest convictions. We in this country do not want a large standing army, nor do we desire anything which savors of militarism. We do need, and those who are intelligent enough to appreciate the situation want, an adequate army. By this I mean an army sufficient for the peace needs of the nation, which means the garrisoning of the Philippines, Panama, Hawaii, Alaska and Porto Rico, together with such force in the United States as will be sufficient for an expeditionary force, such as we sent to Cuba, or to deal with internal disorders which neither the police nor the militia may be adequate to control. We must have an adequate navy, sufficient to perform a navy's function—on one ocean in any case, and, if we are wise, on both oceans. Both the army and navy must be supported by adequate reserves —the navy with a reserve strong enough to completely man the second line ships ordinarily out of commission and the many supply ships and auxiliary ships which must be put into commission in time of war, and in addition men enough to make good the losses of the first six months of war. We must also

have a good militia with reserves, under a large measure of federal control—a militia whose response to the calls of the nation will be prompt and certain—one which will come well trained and well equipped. This can only be accomplished through the federal government fixing the standards and exercising the necessary power of inspection. Unless this can be done the militia cannot be considered a dependable force. Back of it is that great force of citizen soldiers, ordinarily known as volunteers—a force which must be trained in time of peace, in order to be promptly available in time of war. In any case the officers of this force must be provided in time of peace and their provision must include thorough, systematic training. We cannot depend upon volunteers in future wars, as we have in past wars, for the simple reason that the onrush of a modern war is so sudden and all our possible antagonists, concerning whom we need have any serious apprehension, are so thoroughly prepared that there will be no time to train volunteers, and certainly no time to train officers. Washington and the officers of his time were convinced of the folly of depending upon volunteers. They come with a rush from the best of the population during the early stages of war, but their enthusiasm soon passes away and the bounty and the draft follow. In the Revolution our greatest force was, in 1776, about 89,000 men. It dwindled year by year so that in 1781 we had in the field only a little over 29,000 men, and this notwithstanding large bounties

of money and land and the strongest efforts on the part of individuals and Colonial assemblies. The same thing took place in the War of 1812–1814. Men came for a short time, but new men had to take their places; 527,000 different men were in the field during this war. Of this number something over 33,000 were officers.

The frequent change of personnel resulted necessarily in demoralization and inefficiency. It was again attempted through the bounty to produce effects which should have been produced by patriotism. In the Revolution, which was really the birth struggle of the nation, the falling off in volunteering is worthy of the most serious consideration, as is the chaotic condition which resulted from the working of the same system in the War of 1812–1814. This war on land was highly discreditable to us. With the exception of a drawn battle at Lundy's Lane and an unimportant victory on the Thames, our land operations were not only disastrous, but generally highly discreditable. We abandoned Washington to a force of only about 60 per cent. of that of the defenders, with a loss on our side of eight killed and eleven wounded. The greatest force of regulars which England had in this country at any time during the war was a little over 16,800. There was, of course, a considerable number of Indians and militia, but this combined force was only a small fraction of our numerically great force. At the battle of New Orleans (fought after the war) we won a highly creditable

victory. Our troops were well handled and the enemy attempted the impossible. Moreover, the bulk of the men who composed Jackson's army were expert with the rifle.

On the water we had many highly creditable individual ship actions and some creditable fleet actions, but generally speaking, on the high seas our commerce was destroyed and our gallant but small navy bottled up.

In the Civil War we of necessity continued the volunteer system, no general policy looking to military efficiency having been inaugurated, and the two armies, each undisciplined and untrained, learned the game of war together, and after several years were moulded into excellent fighting machines. In this war, as in preceding wars, the volunteer system failed absolutely, and both the North and the South had to go to the draft and every attendant evil of the bounty system, with its accompanying desertions, bounty jumping, etc., which tended to demoralize the public conscience in all which pertained to the sacredness of the military obligation. The number of desertions was enormous. Charles Francis Adams places it as high as 523,000 out of a total enlistment in the northern armies of something over 2,700,000, or nearly one in five.

In the Mexican War we met an unprepared and rather ineffective enemy and the theater of war was so remote that our men were in hand long enough to get them into reasonably good shape, at least to

meet an enemy of the type which confronted us. We had, moreover, an unusually able body of officers, many of whom distinguished themselves greatly in the Civil War, but again, as in all our wars, had we met a prepared and efficient enemy the system would have been our undoing.

You boys must never for a moment accept the very common idea, brought into being largely by the politicians and the Fourth of July orator, that we as a nation have peculiar military ability and that without thorough training we can meet equally good men who have been well trained.

The cowardly abandonment of our Capitol almost without loss on our part shows how unsafe it is to trust untrained troops in combat with well-organized, well-disciplined troops. You must remember, also, that this particular action occurred almost within a generation of the Revolutionary War, and that the men who made up the force defending Washington were drawn from sections which produced many of the best troops of the Revolution. Old Light Horse Harry Lee summed the situation as follows:

That government is a murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed and untaught, where they are to meet men of the same age and strength, mechanized by education and discipline for battle.

Those words are just as true and just as applicable today as they were when they were uttered. We are no longer an Anglo-Saxon race, but a very mixed one.

Blood-strains from all parts of Europe run through our people, and their influence is felt in the descendants of the new-comers. Everything indicates the necessity today, more than ever before, of thorough preparation. Now, while we do not desire a large standing army, we must have the kind of army and an army of the strength referred to above. We must have also a great body of 35,000 or 40,000 reserve officers trained and ready to serve as officers of volunteers. We must have a sound military system—one which tends to produce in the heart of every boy the consciousness of the fact that he is one of the defenders of the country and impels him to make the necessary preparation.

The military system of Switzerland or Australia appeal to me very strongly as models which we could follow to our advantage in all which pertains to military training. Switzerland has had her system in operation long enough to make its application general, and as a result, while a peaceful, orderly country, she stands always ready to defend her rights and to guard her territory. She is absolutely free from all indication of militarism, as ordinarily understood, and yet every man in Switzerland who is physically fit has received a sufficient amount of training to make him an effective and efficient soldier; that this has served to benefit and uplift the people is conclusively shown by her low criminal rate, which is only a fraction of ours, and by the admitted conservatism of her people, their law-abiding habits, their

patriotism and their respect for the rights of others. Contrast her position of today with that of another small European country, which, unlike her, had not made due preparation. In both Switzerland and Australia a large amount of instruction is given through public schools or during the school period of the youth—so much, indeed, that only two or three months of intensive training in camp are necessary to complete the training of the soldier. The officers take a longer and more intensive course, but the system in both countries is worked out so that there is practically no interference with the industrial or educational careers of those under training.

As I have said before, there has been little or no interest in this country in this great question of military training. There has been a general haphazard policy and a blind dependence upon volunteers; in other words, a dependence upon someone else doing one's work. It is an illogical system. There is no reason why one group of the population should assume that another group is going to voluntarily perform their military duties. The obligation to military service is universal. It is a tax upon which all others depend, and a nation which fails to recognize this prepares its own downfall. **This general training can all be effected as has been done in Switzerland and Australia, without a trace of militarism, without any departure from ideals, and with a great resulting improvement in the morals, physique and character of our youth.** In Switzerland and Australia the

training of young boys is principally of a calisthenic character. Later they pass to rifle shooting and military formations. The final finish is put upon them in training at the camps which immediately precede their entry into the first line of the country's defense. You must not think that war is one of the great destroyers of human life. It does take many lives, but it is among the lesser causes of loss of life. Our industrial casualties, not deaths necessarily, but casualties of all kinds, amount to something over 450,000 a year. Of these, about 78,000 or 79,000 result fatally—a loss rather exceeding the average loss of life of two years of the Civil War. Most of these accidents are preventable. The public interest in life-saving is not sufficiently keen to insist on adequate legislation to this end. The losses in the war are more dramatic, more startling, but the lives lost in every day work in the struggle for existence exceed them vastly in number and run on without ceasing, both during peace and war.

The following is a little illustration of the case of our own country, namely, in ten peaceful Fourths of July (the last July 4, 1910), approximately 1,800 persons were killed and something over 35,000 wounded in celebrating the success of a war which ended nearly 130 years before. The number killed equals the number killed in battle or who died of wounds in the Spanish-American War, the Philippines rebellion and the Indian wars of a number of years preceding. The wounded of these ten peaceful

days aggregate seven and a half times the wounded of all these wars. I tell you these things not to prove that war is any less dreadful, or that you should strive less to avoid it, but simply to present to you the truth with reference to the causes which bring about the loss of life. Do not give up your ideals. Strive for universal peace, but while striving do not forget the conditions under which you are living, and, however much you may hope to obtain a condition of world peace, remember that there is no evidence of it today and that if we want to preserve the institutions which have been handed down to us we must be ready to defend them or, as Lord Roberts said:

Strive to stir up, to foster and develop the manly and more patriotic spirit in the nation—a spirit which will induce our youth to realize that they must be not only ready but prepared to guard the heritage handed down to them.

Abandon the theory of chance and adopt that of probability in making wise provisions for peace through preparedness for war.

You hear a great deal about the destructive work of the soldier. I am going to say just a word with reference to his constructive and life-saving work, which has really been his principal function since the close of the Spanish-American War, and indeed it was one of his principal activities during that war. Starting with Porto Rico, we find that, principally due to the efforts of a medical officer of the army, Dr. Bailey

K. Ashford, tropical anemia, or hook-worm disease, as it is ordinarily called, has been about eliminated. Not only was this discovery of value in Porto Rico, but it was made use of throughout our own southern states, with a result of revitalizing and re-energizing hundreds of thousands of people afflicted with this disease. The annual death-rate in Porto Rico alone was reduced by a number exceeding the total number of men killed during the Spanish-American War, and a recent inquiry made of all planters in the island with reference to their workers indicates that, in their opinion, the average increase in efficiency is 60 per cent.—a truly startling figure, and one which illustrates very well the far-reaching and wonderful effects of sanitary measures and preventative medicine. Passing on to Cuba, here we have the wonderful discovery of Major Walter Reed and his associates, Carroll and Lezear, which resulted in discovering the method of transmission of yellow fever and the means of controlling it, and the eventual elimination of that dread disease not only from Cuba, but from all the American troops, with the resulting saving in life, which runs into many thousands each year, and a saving in money so vast that it is difficult to estimate it; for the days of yellow fever, with the consequent quarantine, which tied up the movement of men and materials throughout the entire South, limited the movements of ships coming from yellow fever countries, and the costly disinfection, resulted in an expenditure running into hundreds of millions. Indeed, it

is safe to say that the saving from yellow fever alone every year in life and money has exceeded the cost in each of the Spanish-American War and the Philippines rebellion.

In the Philippines, splendid sanitary work has been done by the army and later by the civil government. Beriberi, one of the most dreaded of the eastern diseases, has been done away with. Malaria has been brought under control. Infant mortality has been halved. Most of this latter work has been done under the civil government, but the foundations were laid by the medical officers of the army who at first had charge of the work. In Panama we see the direct effect of this work in the completion of the Panama Canal. This great and splendid piece of engineering, remarkable as it is from an engineering standpoint, and conducted with wonderful efficiency by General Goethals and his assistants, could not have been built had it not been for the application by General Gorgas of the results of the sanitary discoveries made in Cuba which made it possible to carry on this great work under conditions of health which equalled those anywhere in the United States. It may be truly said without taking one atom of credit from the engineers that this great work was built on a sanitary foundation. Had we not got rid of yellow fever and learned to control malaria, the death-rate would have been so heavy that the work could only have resulted in our hands as it did in the hands of the French, for nothing demoralizes

working forces more effectively than great epidemics. They are worse than battles in some ways.

The mobilization on the Mexican frontier has not been without its great and lasting benefits. It enabled us, because of the prevalence of typhoid in the Mexican villages and along the Rio Grande, to insist upon general typhoid inoculation of officers and men, and the result has been the removal of typhoid from the army. Last year there were 100,000 men scattered from Tinsin to Panama, through the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippines, from Alaska to Porto Rico, as well as all over the United States, and there was not a single death among them from typhoid. When one remembers thousands of cases in the camps of the Spanish-American War, the importance of this discovery is appreciated. The general application was made possible only by the mobilization of troops and in the struggle to protect them. So it was with the discovery concerning yellow fever and the elaboration of the methods employed in controlling malaria. The results of these discoveries are now all of general application, not only to the population in our own country, but to the population of all countries in and bordering on the American tropics, as well as in the insular possessions. Not only were great sanitary results secured through the military arms of the government, but it should be remembered also that it, the military arm, established and maintained a civil government in Porto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines, and conducted these governments with

great success—in Cuba up to the point of the transfer to the Cuban people of a completely organized republic, and in Porto Rico until the transfer to the American civil government; likewise in the Philippines, the military authorities were in full charge during the most trying period and turned over to the civil commission which followed them a well-organized government and a well-filled treasury.

I tell you all this in order that you may understand more fully what the real work of the army has been —that its life saving has counterbalanced scores of times its work as a destructive force, if one may apply the term "destructive forces" to a force used to terminate intolerable conditions and to establish humane, just and equitable governments among dependent people.

An article by the Rev. Dr. Ferguson, on the system in use in the Swiss Federation, showing its convenience and economy, if adapted to the needs of the United States.

THE SWISS SYSTEM

BY DR. HENRY FERGUSON

The United States may fairly be said to be a nation whose one desire and one interest is peace. Yet six times in the course of its short history of 126 years has the nation been exposed to war by the action of other powers. France, Tripoli, the Barbary States, England, Mexico and Spain have all at one time or another been our opponents.

It is impossible for a sovereign state to be free from the dangers of war. Its very independence makes it liable to have to contend for the protection of its national rights and privileges. The only nation sure of not being obliged at some time to fight is the one which has already surrendered to a more powerful state its right of self-defense, or, what is about the same, is so enamored of peace and the prosperity that is supposed to be inseparable from it, that it never dares to resent, for itself or its people, an injury or an insult.

In spite of our pride in the exploits of our soldiers, the military history of our country is, in fact, not a brilliant one. Our navy, small but well trained, has, it is true, always acquitted itself with courage and distinction, but the story of our volunteers is not so

creditable. In 1812, 1846 and in 1898 our volunteers were mustered into camp wholly untrained and ignorant of the first principles of military discipline, though every great American who has ever spoken on the subject had warned us of the result. Moreover, they died like flies in the camps where they were mustered before the fighting, as well as in those in which they were crowded after the fighting was over.

Our men will fight; there is no fear of that; but how many can be brought to the fighting line, is a more serious question. Many suggestions have been made by many persons, military and civilian, in regard to the method which the United States, and the individual states of which it is formed, should adopt to protect themselves from the danger of the occurrence of war when they were least prepared for it. It does not take long for one country to get into war with another—an ultimatum—and, even before the answer is received, a blow is struck, if it seems to the enemy there is any advantage to be gained by doing so. Then it would be too late to prepare to train our boys to fight. Now is the time, when there is no enemy threatening us, when the work can be done calmly, quietly and without excitement.

The adoption of an universal military service like that practiced in France and Germany is not only impracticable, but also so opposed to all our feelings and traditions, that it is useless to propose it; though it is based upon the correct principle of the liability

of every man to fight for his country. But there are other systems besides those of the great military nations of Europe that may well attract our attention as being practical and not severe. But if a hostile fleet attacked New York, no system of practical self-defense would then seem severe.

So many allusions are made to the excellent system by which the Swiss confederation, by a carefully contrived militia, supplies the want of a standing army, which is prohibited by its federal constitution, that it is well to understand explicitly what that system is. By it the Swiss confederation, with a population of 4,000,000, is able to call to the colors, at two days' notice, over 200,000 trained soldiers, and in a week's time can put into the field 300,000 more. To compare this with our country, it is as if we in the United States, with our population of 100,000,000, were able to rely upon the services of 5,000,000 at once, and to be able to add in a week to that number 7,500,000, which would make us safe from any sudden surprise. And this is done without imposing any serious burden upon any citizen, or creating a dangerous military class distinct from the civil population.

The system is as simple as it is admirable, combining the earliest training with the rudiments of elementary compulsory education, and keeping the adult citizen in readiness for service without serious burden.

Every school boy is taught that his country has a

claim upon his services in her defense, and is carefully trained by athletic exercises, approved of and directed by the government, that fit him to use his growing strength to the greatest advantage.

These exercises are not of the nature of a military drill, but furnish a progressive training, beginning when the boys are quite young and continuing through their school life. They not only lead to a symmetrical and careful development of the individuals, but also accustom the children to the common action, under skillful direction, fitting them to fall in readily with the later technical military instruction when the time shall come for it. The great value of this training of the children by the government is that it co-ordinates the school with the subsequent camps of instruction, so that all public energies are directed to a common advantage.

When the boys become young men, rifle shooting is most carefully encouraged, and clubs, societies and associations formed to practice this most useful accomplishment. Prizes are offered by the federal government, by the various cantons (corresponding to our state governments), by the municipalities and the communes, and the young Swiss is taught, as our own ancestors were in Colonial days, to shoot straight, to speak the truth, and to keep his body under subjection.

Once in every year the men of 20 years of age are called upon by their several cantons to meet in a central place within each canton, and take a series of

tests with the object of ascertaining whether they are physically and mentally able to serve their country. The tests are comparatively easy, but of sufficient difficulty to exclude dunces and weaklings whom the confederation has no use for. The physical examination consists of a test of strength requiring the candidate to lift four times in succession in each hand a weight of about thirty-seven pounds. He has to run about eighty yards in fourteen seconds or under—besides passing a fairly rigid physical examination as to the condition of his vital organs. The mental examination consists of reading, writing and arithmetic and the rudiments of Swiss history, besides a short composition on some simple subject, to show the candidate's power of expression. Those who pass are accepted for military training; those who fail to meet these easy requirements are dismissed, but must bear hereafter a heavier share in the national taxation than their more intelligent and athletic brothers who are able to give their personal service.

The recruits are then sent to training camps where they receive from sixty to ninety days instruction, according to the branch of the service they are thought qualified to enter. After this, for eleven years, from the age of 21 to 32, the recruit is called out for eleven days in the year to refresh his training, and then he is transferred from the Elite to the Landwehr or First Reserve. He serves in this for twelve years longer, being called into the field only

in alternate years, and then for eleven days. Then he passes into the Landsturm, or Second Reserve, until at 48 his period of service is completed. The government keeps in existence the head of the ordnance department, the general staff, and the corps of instructors needed for the organization.

There are strong fortifications upon the St. Gotthard Pass, and at Martigny and St. Maurice in the Valais. Each soldier is given his uniform and his rifle, for the care of which he is responsible. Cavalry soldiers have also their horses. With these in hand, mobilization is immediate. The system has not indeed been tested by war, but on the occasions when mobilization has been necessary to preserve the country's neutrality, as in 1870, and at the present day, it has worked well; and the tiny country is loyally and vigorously defended by her own citizen soldiers. Officers are made through merit, and are given special courses, and retained in "active" service for longer periods. The law permits no soldier to decline promotion with its added responsibilities in either the commissioned or non-commissioned grades.

Every soldier is insured against sickness, accident or death, by the government, while under instruction, or while engaged in any military duty.

The great merit of the system lies in the very general extent of the training, with the minimum of interruption to the domestic life and individual affairs of the men who are trained, and, above all, in the ideal, which is constantly held up before every normal

Swiss boy, that the defense of his country is a matter of his own immediate concern, that his country needs and claims, not only his love and his devotion and his pride, but also his personal bodily service.

This is an ideal that many of us believe is none too high to be kept carefully and constantly before the eyes of the no less loyal, no less conscientious boys of the American federation, in this good old commonwealth.

APPENDIX

THE SCHOOLS AND MILITARY TRAINING

BY ANSON T. McCOOK

Less than two years ago, any suggestion of universal military training in the United States would have been regarded by most of us as evidence of mild insanity. Wars, we were told, had ceased save among barbarians. That any nation might be wantonly attacked, in this enlightened age, appeared unthinkable.

Then, out of a clear sky, came the outbreak of war in Europe and the invasion of Belgium, and all our preconceived notions of the permanency of international good fellowship and the safety of any peace-loving people fell to the ground with a crash. And now, while clinging as tenaciously as ever to the ideal of peace, our eyes are opened. Reluctantly we are forced to admit that, even though it takes two to make a quarrel, it takes only one to commit a murder or a robbery, and that international murderers and robbers do exist. We have learned that nations, like athletes, apparently exhausted today, tomorrow may be more vigorous than ever; that the ocean, far from being a barrier to attack, is the broadest and easiest of high-roads; that modern warfare is a complicated science, calling for the highest degree of technical knowledge and requiring enormous bodies of thoroughly trained men. And we are beginning to realize that America, if invaded by any first-class power, could offer less effective resistance than did Belgium to the hosts of the German Empire.

Here, then, is our problem: Hating war as the embodiment of almost all that is evil here below, yet seeing the possibility of its falling suddenly upon us as upon others, how shall we prepare for it—that is to say, against it? First, of course, by greater national self-restraint, by unselfishness, by observance of our obligations to other nations and regard for their susceptibilities. But

what if we are attacked, or it becomes our moral duty to fight?

The position of those who advocate total disarmament for the United States both by land and by sea and, as a necessary corollary, non-resistance, is logical and is founded upon the highest motives; it commands respect if not allegiance. But there can be no respect either for the morals or for the common sense of those who would have us retain some armament without making it sufficient. When threatened by lawless individuals, remain unarmed if your conscience forbids resistance; but, whatever you do, don't draw an empty revolver or shoot in the air!

Our present condition of utter defenselessness requires no comment. It is a fact which cannot be disputed. When we consider that there are five nations, each with enough ships to land from 90,000 to 385,000 veterans upon our shores in a period of between two and three weeks after a declaration of war, the necessity of a stronger fleet as our first line of defense, and of a standing army of more than our present 30,000 mobile regular troops available to meet the first shock of invasion, becomes self-evident.

What is the solution? Scarcely the militia, which in several states exists largely on paper, in too many others is closely allied with politics and, with several notable exceptions, is not really efficient. Certainly we should not discourage the patriotic efforts of those men who are exerting their strength through the only channel at present open to them; on the contrary we should give them our support in all their endeavors which are patriotic rather than selfish. But the fact remains that a system involving a number of separate armies with widely varying standards of work and discipline cannot be relied upon, and it has failed us in the past. Military organizations rise no higher than their leaders. Incapable officers have entailed untold losses in men and money in all our wars. Mixed control spells mediocrity.

Assuredly we cannot solve the problem with untrained volunteers. The utter unreliability of such a body called hastily together to face a sudden and overwhelming emergency cannot be questioned. Washington, referring to those of his day, declared that if he were required under oath to state whether they had been a greater help or hindrance he should be obliged to say the latter. Untrained men are a menace to themselves and, if placed alongside trained troops, are equally a menace to them and to the cause for which they are fighting. "That government is a murderer of its citizens which sends them into the field unprepared and untrained," said Light Horse Harry Lee, and he knew whereof he spoke.

A huge permanent military establishment, similar in character to those existing on the continent of Europe at the outbreak of the present war, would undoubtedly make for military strength but is a remedy which most of us would reject as worse than the disease. As we prefer that our government remain a republic, notwithstanding its tendency toward inefficiency, so we prefer that the safety of this nation rest with its citizens, in spite of the hazard involved. It is better for the people and for their government that they carry in their own hands the security of their institutions.

In the last analysis the citizens of any nation must constitute its defense under whatever form of government. If war comes they must fight or the nation perish. Why, then, should they not be taught the use of arms for their own protection and that of their country? Why should they not be trained, every one of them—and in advance of trouble? Even if an enormous standing army of the European type is said to be repugnant to free institutions, a menace to liberty and an economic burden, a citizen soldiery trained to the use of arms involves no undue sacrifice of time or money and carries in itself the guarantees of freedom and of safety. In the words of George Washington, "A free people ought not only to be armed but disciplined, to which end a uniform and

well-digested plan is requisite." In universal military knowledge, as well as in a realization of the universal duty of service in case of war, must be our safety and our strength; and any training, to be effective, should be begun at an early age.

The little Republic of Switzerland, although her system would not fit us without some modification, furnishes a splendid precedent. Germany might have struck France through Switzerland rather than through Belgium, but something more formidable than the Alps deterred her—a nation trained in arms from its youth up. And who can say that this discipline for their boys and young men has made the Swiss aggressive or fond of war, or has given them a taste for bloodshed, or robbed them of their love of home and of liberty?

"Military education" is largely a matter of definition. Advocacy of appropriate training in the schools does not mean giving youngsters of eight or ten Napoleon's Campaigns to read any more than it would involve beginning their mathematics with a table of logarithms. Like education along other lines, it should be progressive. It is one of the greatest possible mistakes to feed into the minds of the young a mass of advanced ideas which cannot be assimilated. Both the Swiss and the Australian systems begin with simple things and develop gradually. Such also was the method of procedure which succeeded so admirably with those American children of maturer years who met last summer at Plattsburg. Perhaps 90 per cent. of the men who attended the so-called Business Men's Camps were wholly ignorant of the subject they had come to study, and the teachers, regular Army officers, were wise enough to begin slowly. In consequence, Plattsburg was a very excellent and successful primary school. The men graduated, that is to say, reasonably good "high privates in the rear rank." Now it is one thing, of course, to teach children and another their elders, but certain problems are common to both. While, therefore, Plattsburg was devoted to the education of

the "older young," its work can profitably be studied in working out a system for the "younger young"— certainly for those of high school and college age.

The training of boys of from ten to fourteen might properly be restricted almost wholly to calisthenics and other activities looking to physical betterment. In this, out-of-door work and simple exercises should be preferred to gymnasium apparatus and gymnastic "stunts." The aim should be first of all disciplinary. As to the physical aspects, the idea is not to develop a few special muscles or to train the subject for exhibition purposes, but rather to bring about a generally robust physique—sound heart and lungs, reasonably muscular arms and legs, agility, co-ordination, erectness of carriage, knowledge of how to walk. Walking is an art in which we are not universally proficient. Short, frequent periods of exercise are better in every way than occasional protracted sessions. The bracing effect of ten or fifteen minutes of simple work in the open air every day is incalculable. Regular exercise is as essential as regular food. Long periods and difficult work are fatiguing, and fatigue should be avoided. We all know that the younger the child, the shorter the time during which his attention can be held. And, since the disciplinary or moral effect is more important than the physical, whatever is done should be done "at attention" and wholeheartedly, or not at all. As to fresh air, while it is said to be an American fashion to regard nothing as worth while which is not expensive, by all means let us have the school yard or wide open windows. If these physical drills (why not more than one?) take place in the middle of the school session, the children will come back to their books refreshed physically and mentally.

Just what exercises should be performed is a matter of detail. The important thing is how they are performed. Slouchiness, inattention, talking, carelessness, should not be brooked for one instant. This much strict discipline for a few minutes a day will hurt no one, even

according to the most advanced theories of moral suasion. To illustrate: some 600 free and independent American citizens, ranging from 18 to 60 years of age, "did exercises" at the September Plattsburg Camp under the leadership of Captain Koehler, for many years Instructor of Gymnastics at West Point. We did not always undertake them cheerfully. Usually we were turned over to him on returning to camp, hot and tired and dirty, more eager for rest and a wash than anything else in the world. But, because it was a part of the system, we marched down and took our places before him, even if rebellion lurked secretly in our hearts. At the end of fifteen minutes he actually had us good-humored, rested and ready for more. Now he was a genius, perhaps; but what he could get out of us under such trying conditions no doubt an ordinary human being could accomplish under easier circumstances. For one thing, Captain Koehler never held his pupils over twenty minutes; he gave them frequent rests; he never kept them at one exercise until they were tired of it; he retained their interest by varying the program and introducing occasional novelties; he stood in front of his classes and did the exercises himself, and did them with the same snap and precision that he required of others; before beginning any movement, all were brought sharply to attention, and woe to the man who turned his head or scratched his nose after that! We "stood for it" because we knew it was good for us, and what was good for us is good for Americans generally, whether grown-ups or children. The secret of success will be to set a high standard of discipline at the outset and adhere to it rigidly.

At the age of 13 or 14 additions could be made to the program, such as cooking, fire-lighting, signalling, first aid, swimming, nature walks and the other out-door exercises in which our Boy Scouts delight, not forgetting their foremost principle, that of doing for others—the very foundation of true patriotism and good citizenship.

"Military drill" is not at all essential and may be dis-

pensed with altogether so far as the school curriculum is concerned. Indeed, everything thus far suggested would benefit any child and, by making him a stronger and better citizen, benefit the state, totally irrespective of war or future military service.

One of the greatest obstacles to introducing military drill in the schools is the difficulty of finding teachers who would insist on its being done properly, and nothing could be more vicious than a sloppy execution of the manual of arms or marching by fours. Moreover, while knowledge of how to march in fours has some military value, it can be acquired by any fairly intelligent person in a short time, while the manual of arms has in itself no military value whatsoever. The chief virtue in close order drill lies in the discipline inculcated, and if the drill be performed in an undisciplined way the very opposite result is arrived at. Moreover, this is the showiest feature of military training and is the only part that carries with it any of the "glamour of war" of which we read so much. Now no one has ever heard of a fire-drill arousing a desire on the part of the children to set the school house ablaze, and the fear of arousing war-like feelings in children through military training seems groundless. Nevertheless, any possible danger, while the boy is still of tender years, can be avoided by omitting the only feature of it that involves "pomp and panoply." Certainly a showy uniform is undesirable. Half-way measures should be avoided as breeding ignorance and incompetence.

At the age of 15 or 16, body and mind are sufficiently advanced to make some introductory military training a possibility. It is, of course, desirable that the soldier should know how to shoot, and the earlier he learns the better. Usually that is not a very difficult process, but it takes time; and when war comes there are many other things to be attended to. Besides, shooting trains the eyes, the nerves and the muscles in accuracy and co-ordination. Sub-caliber ranges are not expensive and

are less dangerous than practice in the open with high-power rifles. They should constitute the first step, after the usual sighting and holding exercises which require no ranges at all—not even ammunition. But nothing can take the place of work out-doors, with actual distances to be covered by eye and bullet and with the distracting effects of light, shadow and wind. This would constitute the final stage, held out to those boys who qualified in the preliminaries. For that purpose we should have to have more ranges, but they are badly needed, anyhow, for our militia. Such shooting would not consume much time if properly systematized. Two Saturday holidays on the ranges each year, after the completion of his preliminary work, ought to prove sufficient to qualify the average boy as a marksman. It should be possible for all who show ability indoors to get at least two chances out of doors between the first of May and the first of November—this, too, with small enough squads to entail the minimum of danger and provide the maximum of instruction.

In connection with this work, "tactical walks" could be taken and exercises given in estimating distances, taking cover, patrolling, sketching and the like. Divide your boys into two parties (of course unarmed) and assign them to a certain sector, neither group, however, knowing just where the other may be encountered. Here is a game of out-of-doors hide and seek which is healthful, full of fun and most useful from the military standpoint. Any healthy boy of 15 or 16 would take to it like a duck to water. Map reading, lectures, simple problems and other indoor work could be reserved for rainy weather.

At about this same age, that is, from 15 up to 18, the boy ought to be strong enough, subject, of course, to physical examination, to take part in voluntary summer camps. It is no easy matter to handle a group of men or boys for four or five weeks, and a shorter time could not be really effective. Most of the boys, like the rest of us on entering the field, would be "soft," and must

be carefully hardened before anything strenuous was attempted. Otherwise one of the most important purposes of the camp would be defeated and the instruction largely nullified, because the recipients would be too weary to take it all in. The culmination of these camps should certainly be a week or ten days of hiking or maneuvers, following the plan of the Students' Camps which for the past few years have been conducted so successfully by the War Department for college and school boys of 18 years and upwards. In this connection, a camp for boys of 15 to 17 (just too young for the Students' Camps) is to be held this year at Fort Terry on Plum Island, at the entrance to Long Island Sound. This camp, which is an experiment largely the idea of Dr. Drury, headmaster of St. Paul's School, New Hampshire, will be observed with great interest.

Boys who attend such summer camps should be supplied with a simple field uniform and the necessary equipment. Indeed, those in the earlier stages of development might perhaps be given part of an inconspicuous outfit as in Australia—for example, hats and leggings to those old enough to go on the afternoon or Saturday walks, with canvas trousers and olive-drab shirts later on. Except in connection with the camps, no arms need be furnished; none of the exercises outlined, save the rifle shooting, call for the handling of a gun, although the older boys who have shown themselves careful might properly be supplied with light rifles.

At the age of 18 or 19 or 20 the serious work of instruction should begin, and should be universal for those physically capable of performing it, including those who have left school. At that time of life, any normal young man is amply strong enough to do the work which proved so useful and at the same time so beneficial at the Student and Business Men's Camps. Two months of intensive training, even if not repeated, will go far towards imparting the fundamental duties of a soldier. This is substantially the length of the Swiss first-year tour of

duty. A month or five weeks might suffice, but a longer period is preferable; there is no question that the second month would be worth many times the first. Those of us who completed our Plattsburg duties can testify that the fourth week, devoted to maneuvers, was many times more valuable than all the preceding days taken together, although we could not have secured satisfactory results that fourth week without the other three ahead of it; indeed those who left before the "hike" might almost better have stayed away altogether, and an extra month there would have done wonders for us. Let this training, therefore, continue two months if possible and compensate by taking less time when the man is older and his time more valuable. The loss of sixty days at this stage will not wreck any career, and employers would much prefer one longer period to numerous short ones. While Australia calls for a shorter first period, it is supplemented by a great deal of special work which may be impossible for us.

If the young man is physically fit to start with (and he should not be accepted at camp unless he is) this experience will do him an immense amount of good physically and benefit him morally and intellectually as well. Here again Plattsburg can be cited, for the good done its participants of all ages. A youth of 18 to 20 possesses the greatest elasticity of body and mind and the greatest capacity for learning. At that age, therefore, the greatest results can be accomplished in the shortest time. If his training is handled with common sense, he will go back to his family and to his work more robust, more alert, quicker in thought and in action, better equipped generally for the battle of life, a finer, stronger citizen. And, not the least important, he will be in a position to serve efficiently as a soldier if his country ever needs him. What logic or patriotism is there in giving to one's country any service which is not the best of which one is capable? If the worst befalls and war comes, every man owes the duty of service; voluntary enlistment—*i. e.*, fighting for

other men who stay safely at home—is as ridiculous in principle as voluntary payment of taxes would be. Moreover, if the young man is to fight, let him know how to fight with the least danger to himself. It is axiomatic that the more ignorant and the less disciplined the soldier, the greater his danger and the poorer the chance of his being preserved for himself, his family and his country.

Boys physically backward should be given training which would fit them for usefulness in the all-important departments of supply, transportation and the like. All should be catalogued and assigned their definite duties in the event of trouble.

What, if anything, is to be done in subsequent years is a supplemental consideration. The Swiss call their young men to the colors for a few days every year after their first year until they reach the age of 32, after which they cease to be members of the Elite (or Auszug) and enter the First Reserve (or Landwehr). A similar system obtains in Australia. Such a continuation training is chiefly a question of military policy, but with our great population it might be omitted save for those ambitious to become non-commissioned or commissioned officers. Even if we made supplemental training entirely voluntary and only 10 per cent. responded, we should be very comfortably off in a few years by reason of the extent of our population.

There are many important features of the proposed system which deserve extended consideration. One is its tendency to do away with state lines in the later stages of the work. Another advantage is the complete democracy entailed. Young men of every walk of life would be thrown together on an absolute equality—not a supposititious but an actual equality of work and hardship in the field, with all bent on the same purpose, all actuated by one high motive. The leaders would be those who proved their ability to lead, irrespective of wealth or station. If the training were not universal, it would not be democratic; if it did not involve giving as well as getting, it would not be democratic.

An all-important question is that of teachers, whether for children or for the young men. In the case of the latter, regular Army officers would at first prove the best instructors, but little by little their pupils would grow up to carry on their work. Better have few and have them good than fall back on mediocrity. The conduct of purely physical exercises in the schools is difficult enough, but is simple in comparison with any supplemental training. Indeed, in almost every detail of the proposed system, we shall have to feel our way to a great extent. Fortunately, we have the experience of Switzerland and Australia to guide us. Both arrived at their present state of excellence only after years of work and experiment and study. We cannot hope to achieve our goal in one year, or even in ten. But we can make a beginning.

Just what form that beginning shall take is our present problem. We can safely start with the proposition that five to ten weeks of intensive training for every young man in (let us say) his nineteenth summer is the essential feature of the program. That should stand in any event. And, as leading up to it, a comprehensive scheme of physical training in the primary schools, preferably supplemented by exercises calculated to create quickness of thought, promptness of decision, instant obedience to those in command, accuracy, punctuality, teamwork, co-ordination, ability to care for oneself on and off the field, cleanness of living, devotion to an ideal.

Then, if war does not come, we shall have our reward in a stronger, healthier, more loyal type of American citizen; and if the worst befalls we shall find that we have reared a true citizen soldiery, ready to take up arms and with a knowledge of how to use them. This very fact will militate against war. A soldier wedded to his home is soberer, more thoughtful of others, less likely to be pushed or cajoled into a needless conflict, the horrors of which are only too well known to him. And so, in the words of Washington, by preparing for war we shall have created the most effectual means of preserving peace.

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